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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.

At issue in this appeal is physical custody of the twin daughters of the parties, appellant
Zane Reed (Zane) and respondent Chelsea Sorensen, formerly known as Chelsea Reed (Chelsea).
Zane and Chelsea are the parties of ten-year-old daughters. Under the terms of the parties' 2008
divorce decree, the children resided primarily with Chelsea, with Zane receiving substantial
visitation with the children. The children spent the majority of their life in Blackfoot, Idaho,
surrounded by their parents and extended family. The dispute between the parties centers on
Chelsea's unilateral decision to relocate the children to Havre, Montana for 2-3 years in pursuit
of her husband's career opportunities, with an eventual plan to return to the Blackfoot area.
Upon learning of Chelsea's intent to move the children to Havre, Montana, Zane filed
with the magistrate court a motion for temporary orders, seeking to prohibit Chelsea from
relocating the children to Montana, and a petition to modify child custody, in which Zane sought
for a court order prohibiting Chelsea from relocating the children to Montana or, in the
alternative, awarding Zane primary physical custody of the children. Chelsea countered with a
motion for temporary orders, in which she sought an order permitting her to relocate the children
to Montana. Upon the conclusion of the hearing on the motions for temporary orders, during
which each party introduced evidence and testimony, Chelsea was permitted to relocate the
children to Montana during the pendency of the custody modification proceedings.
The parties presented evidence at a two-day trial on Zane's petition to modify the parties'
divorce decree in December 2015. Following the conclusion of the trial, the magistrate court
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issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, in which he ordered the children remain with
Chelsea in Montana, with Zane entitled to visitation of at least once a month for three days,
alternating holidays, and six weeks during the summer. Following receipt of the magistrate
court's judgment, Zane moved for permission to appeal directly to the Idaho Supreme Court,
which the magistrate court granted.
B. Course of Proceedings.

Zane filed his Verified Petition to Modify Divorce Decree and Motion for Temporary
Order, together with a supporting affidavit, on August 4, 2015. (R Vol. I, pp. 2, 28-31.) Zane filed
an Amended Petition to Modify Child Custody on August 10, 2015. (Id. at pp. 3, 32-36.) In
response, Chelsea filed her Motion for Temporary Order, seeking an order permitting her to
relocate with the children to Havre, Montana, together with a supporting affidavit, on August 31,
2015. (Id. at p. 3.) A hearing on the parties' respective motions for temporary orders was held on
September 30, 2015, after which Magistrate Judge James Barrett ruled that Chelsea could
relocate the children to Havre, Montana, prior to the hearing on Zane's petition to modify the
parties' divorce decree. (Id. at pp. 52-54.)
The trial on Zane's petition to modify the parties' divorce decree commenced on
December 10, 2015 and concluded on December 11, 2015 in Bingham County. During the course
of the proceeding, Zane called two expert witnesses, Kirsten Griggs and Blake Gamer, both of
whom testified in person in the courtroom as to the children's best interests vis-a-vis Chelsea's
unilateral move to Havre, Montana. (See generally Tr Vol. I, pp. 58-116; Tr Vol. I, pp. 233-254.)
Chelsea called one expert witness, Ellen Savage, electronically via Skype to address the best
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interests of the children. (See generally id. at pp. 143-174, 182-205.) Each party called fact
witnesses during its case in chief, and each party testified.
On January 11, 2016, the magistrate court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of
law. (R Vol. I, pp. 57-72.) The magistrate court determined that it was in the children's best
interests to remain in Chelsea's primary physical custody, with Zane to receive visitation of three
days each month, six weeks in the summer, and alternating holidays. (Id.)
C. Statement of Facts.
Zane and Chelsea were married on or about February 14, 2003 in Idaho Falls, Idaho. (R
Vol. I, p. 11.) During their marriage, their daughters A.L.R. and A.R.R. were

on

. (Id.) The parties divorced on February 29, 2008, with the parties sharing joint legal
custody of the children, Chelsea receiving primary physical custody of the children, and Zane
entitled to visitation on Saturdays and three evenings each month. (Id. at pp. 22-27.) In the years
since entry of the divorce decree and prior to Zane filing his petition to modify the decree, the
parties cooperated in informally adjusting the visitation schedule to better facilitate co-parenting
of the children. (R Vol. I, p. 108, Hr'g Tr 49:25-51: 11.) For more than six years prior to Zane
filing his petition to modify the parties' divorce decree, the children spent every other weekend
with Zane. (Id.) Zane has also attended his children's school functions and athletic events. (R
Vol. I, p. 107, Hr'g Tr 44:23-45: 19.)
The children have spent the majority of their lives in Blackfoot, Idaho. (Id. at p. 117,
Hr'g Tr 84:13-16.) The parties' parents

the children's grandparents

also live in Blackfoot, as

well as other extended family members, including grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins. (Tr
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Vol. I, p. 46, L. 7-p. 48, L. 11; R Vol. I, p. 100, Hr'g Tr 18:12-18.) The children frequently
spent time with these extended family members, including being babysat by Zane's parents on
occasion, at both Zane's and Chelsea's request. (R Vol. I, p. 98, Hr'g Tr 9:12-25; id. at p. 141,
Hr'g Tr 182:4-25.) In addition, Chelsea's father, the children's maternal grandfather, is the
principal of the children's school, Snake River Middle School. (R Vol. I, p. 127, Hr'g Tr 126:25127 :9; Tr Vol. I, p. 301, L. 24 - p. 302, L. 6.) The children would see their grandfather every day
at school. (Tr Vol. I, p. 317, L. 4-8.) The Snake River School District runs on a four-day school
schedule, Monday through Thursday. (R Vol. I, p. 107, Hr'g Tr 46:18-47:5.)
After the parties' divorce, each party subsequently became involved in serious
relationships that produced children. Zane married Brooke Casto in August 2010. (Tr Vol. I, p.
258, L. 12-17.) During their marriage, Zane and Brooke had a daughter. (Tr Vol. I, p. 263, L. 813.) In addition, Zane served as a father to Brooke's daughter from a previous relationship. (Tr
Vol. I, p. 265, L. 17-20.) Zane and Brooke divorced in August 2014, but Zane continues to have a
relationship with both his daughter with Brooke and Brooke's daughter from a previous
relationship. (Tr Vol. I, p. 258, L. 17; R Vol. I, p. 112, 66:10-67:16.) At Brooke's request, Zane
will watch these girls at her home when she is away. (Tr Vol. I, p. 292, L. 11 -p. 293, L. 17.)
According to Brooke, a witness called by Chelsea during her case-in-chief, Zane is a "good dad"
and a "wonderful father." (Tr Vol. I, p. 263, L. 8-1 O; id. at p. 286, L. 8 - p. 287, L. 11.) After his
divorce from Brooke, Zane began dating Kate Nice. (R Vol. I, p. 116, Hr'g Tr 82:11-24.) Kate
lives in Boise with her children from a previous relationship. (Id. at pp. 115-16, Hr'g Tr 79:1518, 80:11-18.)
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After her divorce from Zane, Chelsea married Daniel Sorensen in August 2009. (Id at p.
117, Hr'g Tr 84:17-22.) Chelsea and Daniel have two sons together. (Id. at p. 117, Hr'g Tr 84:2384:4.) Daniel graduated from Idaho State University in August 2015 with a physician's assistant
degree. (Id at pp. 128-29, Hr'g Tr 131 :22-132:4.) Daniel received a physician's assistant job
offer from Northern Montana Hospital in Havre, Montana, after his graduation from Idaho State
University. (Id at p. 128, Hr'g Tr 131: 10-21.) The job offer from Northern Montana Hospital
included significant incentives such as student loan repayment. (Id at p. 131, Hr'g Tr 140:14141 :23.) Daniel also received a physician's assistant job offer from Medicine Bow, Wyoming,
but declined to take the position. (Id at p. 130, Hr'g Tr 138:18-139:1.) Chelsea and Daniel both
testified they plan to return to the Blackfoot area in two to three years when Daniel can obtain
employment as a physician's assistant in the area. (Id at p. 133, Hr'g Tr 150:22-24; id at p. 121,
Hr'g Tr 101:7-18.)
Prior to her move to Havre, Montana, Chelsea was employed as a school teacher. (Id at
p. 127, Hr'g Tr 124:16-125:6.) Upon Daniel Sorensen's graduation from Idaho State University
with his physician's assistant degree, Chelsea resigned her position to instead stay home with her
children. (Id)
Zane is a project supervisor with Concrete Placing, charged with overseeing and
administering construction projects. (Id at p. 104, Hr'g Tr 32:12-15.) Though Zane travels on
occasion for work, he resides at a house in Blackfoot he rents from his grandfather. (Id at pp.
111-12, Hr'g Tr 63:4-14, 64:11-65:4.) Zane's mother testified that she and her husband can
continue to help with any child care needs that might arise, should the children reside in
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Blackfoot. (Id. at 141, Hr'g Tr 182:4-25.)
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

A. Whether the magistrate court's findings were based on the substantial and
competent expert witness testimony.
B. vVhether the magistrate court abused its discretion in permitting Cheisea's
expert witness to testify via Skype.

C. Whether the magistrate court abused its discretion in allowing Ms. Savage's
testimony.
D. Whether the magistrate court abused its discretion in determining it was in the
children's best interests to relocate to Havre, Montana.
E. Whether the magistrate court abused its discretion in improperly considering
the tender years doctrine in issuing its decision.

III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Zane claims his attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Rule 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules,
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, Idaho Code§ 12-120, and Idaho Code § 12-121.
IV. ARGUMENT
A. Standard of Review.

Idaho appellate courts review a magistrate court's child custody determination under an
abuse of discretion standard. Schneider v. Schneider, 151 Idaho 415,420,258 P.3d 350,355
(2011) (citing Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448,454, 80 P.3d 1049, 1055 (2003)). Under
an abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court engages in the following analysis:
[T]he Court asks first whether the magistrate court correctly perceived the
custody issue as one of discretion; then whether the magistrate court acted within
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to the court; and finally, whether the
magistrate court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.
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Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278,282,281 P.3d 115, 119 (2012) (citing Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho
859, 861-62, 187 P.3d 1234, 1236-37 (2008)). A magistrate court abused its discretion if its
"findings are clearly erroneous such that the court's findings are not based on substantial and
competent evidence." Schneider, 151 Idaho at 420,258 P.3d at 355. In child custody
modification proceedings, '"[a]n abuse of discretion occurs when the evidence is insufficient to
support a magistrate's conclusion that the interests and welfare of the children would be best
served' by the magistrate court's determination." Clair, 153 Idaho at 282, 281 P.3d at 119 (citing
Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 713, 170 P.3d 375,378 (2007)).
In ruling on evidentiary issues in child custody modification proceedings, a magistrate
court "has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, and to determine whether a witness is
qualified as an expert." Clair, 153 Idaho at 283,281 P.3d at 120 (citing State v. Perry, 139 Idaho
520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003)). A magistrate court's ruling on the introduction of evidence
is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Clair, 153 Idaho at 282-83, 281 P.3d at 119120 (citing Perry, 139 Idaho at 521, 81 P.3d at 1231). A magistrate abuses its discretion in
admitting or excluding evidence if such a ruling is a "manifest abuse of the [magistrate] court's
discretion and a substantial right of the party is affected." Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co.,
127 Idaho 565, 574, 903 P.2d 730, 739 (1995).
B. The magistrate court's findings were not based on the substantial and competent
expert witness testimony.

The magistrate court abused its discretion in failing to consider the substantial and
competent expert witness testimony offered at trial. Despite the hours of testimony provided by
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expert witnesses, the magistrate court failed to evaluate or even address the expert
recommendations in its findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. (See generally R Vol. I, pp. 57-

72.
A magistrate court has the discretion to determine the admissibility of expert witness
testimony. Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278,290,281 P.3d 115, 127 (citing Jones v. Crawforth, 147
Idaho 11, 21,205 P.3d 660,670 (2009)). A magistrate court is not limited to considering only
those custody arrangements advocated by expert witnesses at trial, but may instead act within its
discretion to craft a custody arrangement that is in the best interests of the children. Milliron v.
Milliron, 116 Idaho 253,255, 775 P.2d 145, 147 (Ct. App. 1989). However, a magistrate court

abuses its discretion if its findings are "not based on substantial and competent evidence" or
"when the evidence is insufficient to support a magistrate's conclusion that the interests and
welfare of the children would be best served by the magistrate court's order." Clair, 153 Idaho at
282, 281 P .3d at 119 (internal citations omitted).
Zane's expert witnesses, Kirsten Griggs and Blair Garner, testified extensively regarding
their recommendations for primary custody of the children to remain in Blackfoot. (See generally
Tr Vol. I. pp. 58-117, 233-257.) In addition, Chelsea's expert, Ellen Savage, provided testimony
via Skype regarding her recommendations for primary custody of the children to remain with
Chelsea in Montana. (See generally id. at pp. 143-211.) For the reasons set forth below, the
magistrate court abused its discretion by first allowing Ms. Savage to testify via Skype and then
denying the motion to strike her testimony. See infra. However, the magistrate court made no
mention of Ms. Savage's testimony, including its evidentiary shortcomings, in its findings of fact

Appellant Brief 12

and conclusions oflaw. Likewise, the magistrate court made no mention, for good or ill,
regarding Ms. Griggs' and Mr. Garner's testimonies.
The substantial and competent expert witness testimony offered at trial by Ms. Griggs
and Mr. Garner supported a custody arrangement that would see the children remaining in
Blackfoot, rather than relocating to Havre, Montana. (Tr Vol. I, p. 71, L. 25 - p. 72, L. 15; id. at
p. 99, L. 24

p. 100, L. 19.) Ms. Griggs and Mr. Garner each spoke at length regarding their

respective thoughts as to the children's best interests. (Jd.) Likewise, Ms. Griggs and Mr. Garner
spoke to the detrimental effects the children would experience through excessive travel between
Blackfoot and Havre, as well as the stresses inherent in a future return move to Blackfoot. (Tr
Vol. I, p. 68, L. 25 - p. 69, L. 24; id. at p. 252, L. 23 - p. 253, L. 14; id. at p. 70, L. 4-24; id. at p.
240, L. 10- p. 241, L. 13.)
The extensive testimony from Zane's expert witnesses called for primary physical
custody of the children to remain in Blackfoot. Contrary to this testimony, the magistrate court
determined it was in the children's best interests to relocate with Chelsea to Havre, Montana. In
making this determination, the magistrate court did not address the detrimental effects the
children would experience in traveling from Havre to Blackfoot for visitation with Zane. (See
generally R Vol. I, pp. 57-72.) The magistrate court also failed to address the impact of Chelsea's
planned move back to Blackfoot in 2-3 years, when the children are entering adolescence. (Id.)
The magistrate court ignored these key issues in its order on child custody, without any reference
to the applicable expert witness testimony.
Though the magistrate court was empowered to order a custody arrangement different
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from that articulated by Ms. Griggs and Mr. Gamer, the magistrate court's utter failure to
distinguish Zane's expert witness testimony, including why it found such testimony to be
inconclusive in determining the best interests of the children, was an abuse of discretion. The
magistrate court offered no explanation of whether it considered or disregarded the expert
witness testimony in drafting its custody order, rendering it impossible to determine if the
evidence is sufficient to support the magistrate court's conclusion that the best interests of the
children called for relocation to Havre, Montana. The magistrate court abused its discretion in
failing to address the weight of expert witness testimony in its findings of fact and conclusions of
law.
C. The magistrate court abused its discretion in permitting Chelsea's expert
witness to testify via Skype.

The magistrate court abused its discretion in permitting Chelsea's expert witness to
testify via Skype during the trial on Zane's petition to modify the parties' divorce decree. Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 43 requires,
In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless
otherwise provided by statute or by these rules, the Idaho Rules of Evidence, or
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Idaho.
IDAHO R. C1v. P. 43 (2016) (emphasis added). 1 Under the purview of Rule 43 as presently
constituted, a witness must testify in open court unless otherwise allowed under another Idaho
court rule. An Alabama appellate court, in interpreting similar language in Rule 43 of the
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, noted the following:

1 The

cited text to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 43 is effective until July 1, 2016. The revised text of Rule 43,
effective as of July 1, 2016, is addressed, infra.
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Rule 43(a) states that witness testimony is to be taken "in open court." "Open
court" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary 1123 (8th ed. 2004), as "[a] court
that is in session, presided over by a judge, attended by the parties and their
attorneys, and engaged in judicial business. Furthermore, the Committee
Comments on 1973 Adoption of Rule 43(a) state:
"Rule 43(a) will make oral testimony before the court in an equity
proceeding the rule, rather than the exception. This desirable change gives the
trial court the obvious advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses so as to
determine more readily their veracity (or lack thereof) and the weight to be given
their testimony."

Greener v. Killough, 1 So.3d 93, 102 (Ala.Civ.App. 2008). The Greener court concluded that,
based on the plain language of Rule 43, the probate court abused its discretion by allowing a
physician to testify by telephone. Id. at 103. Because the physician's testimony was inadmissible
under Rule 43, the probate court committed reversible error in allowing the testimony. Id.
Under the current language ofldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 43, the requirement that a
witness testify in open court can be overcome if otherwise authorized elsewhere in the Idaho
court rules. IDAHO R. Civ. P. 43 (2016). In permitting Chelsea's expert witness, Ellen Savage, to
testify over Skype, the magistrate court cited Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure 501. (Trial
Tr. 10:7-11:2.) Specifically, the magistrate court noted that Rule 501(d) made such testimony
"allowable." (Id., 10:23-25.) Rule 501 of the family law procedural rules addresses motion
practice, providing in part:

D. Hearings by telephone conference or video teleconference. The court may
hold a telephone conference or video hearing on, ( 1) any motion, other than
motions for summary judgment unless the parties stipulate or (2) any pretrial
matter.
IDAHO R. FAMILY LAW P. 50l(d) (2016).
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Rule 501 does not speak to permitting an expert witness to testify via Skype at a trial on a
petition to modify child custody. Instead, Rule 50I(d) only permits courts to conduct conferences
or hearings and pretrial conferences via telephone or video conferencing. Notably, Rule 501 (d)
does not permit a court to conduct a hearing on a motion for summary judgment via telephone or
videoconferencing unless the parties stipulate. Given Rule 50I(d)'s inherent limitations,
including its narrow scope in addressing telephone and videoconference appearances in motion
practice, Rule 501 (d) does not permit a magistrate judge to allow a witness to testify at trial via
Skype.
Had the drafters of the family law procedural rules intended to empower courts to allow
witness testimony via teleconference or videoconference, such a rule would be included in Rule
701 et seq. of the family law procedural rules, those addressing pretrial and trial procedure.
However, instead of language authorizing teleconference or videoconference testimony at trial,
Rule 712 of the family law procedural rules instead reiterates Rule 43 of the civil procedural
rules:
A. Taking of testimony. In all trials the testimony of witnesses shall be taken
orally in open court, unless otherwise provided by statute or by these rules, the
Idaho Rules of Evidence, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court ofldaho.
IDAHO

R.

FAMILY LAW

P. 712 (2016). The drafters of the family law procedural rules declined to

extend Rule 501 's permitted teleconferencing and videoconferencing to Rule 712 's rules for
taking testimony at trial. The magistrate court's determination that Rule 50I(d) rendered Ms.
Savage's testimony via Skype "allowable" during the trial on Zane's petition to modify the
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parties' divorce decree was an abuse of discretion and contrary to the limitations of both Rules
501 and 712.
The magistrate also abused his discretion in permitting Ms. Savage to testify under the
text ofldaho Rule of Civil Procedure 43, effective as of July 1, 2016:
(a) In Open Court. At trial, the witnesses' testimony must be taken in open court
unless a statute, these rules, the Idaho Rules of Evidence or other rules adopted by
the Idaho Supreme Court provide otherwise. For good cause in compelling
circumstances and with appropriate safeguards, the court may permit testimony
in open court by contemporaneous transmission from a different location.
IDAHO R. C1v. P. 43 (effective date July 1, 2016) (emphasis added). The change to Rule 43 of
Idaho's civil procedural rules aligns with a 1996 revision to Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which now permits a court to allow testimony by contemporaneous transmission from
a different location in light of compelling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 43 (2016). 2
The Seventh Circuit recently examined the sufficiency of testimony via
videoconferencing technology in Perotti v. Quinones, 790 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2015). In Perotti,
an inmate appealed a district court's decision denying the inmate's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus ad testificandum and arranging instead for the inmate to participate via videoconference
in proceedings on his retaliation claims against prison instructors and administrators. Id. at 71314. In reviewing the inmate's writ, the district court determined that because the inmate, who had
been classified as extremely dangerous, was asking the government to bear the cost of his

2 Notably,

Rule 712 of the family law procedural rules will not be changed under the 2016 amendments to Idaho
court rules to adapt the new language of Rule 43.
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transport from New Jersey to Indiana, and because the inmate was not scheduled to be released
from prison until at least 2019, having the inmate appear by video was a realistic alternative. Id.
at 715. At trial, the "video feed from Perotti's place of incarceration was displayed on a 42-inch
monitor in the courtroom, the size of which permitted everyone in the court, including the jury,
to see his facial expressions. With the exception of a brief interruption in the feed ... there is no
indication that anyone in the courtroom had any difficulty seeing, hearing, or understanding
Perotti." Id. at 716.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision denying the inmate's writ,
quoting applicable language from the advisory committee to the 1996 amendment to Federal
Rule 43:
The importance of presenting live testimony in court cannot be forgotten. The
very ceremony of trial and the presence of the factfinder may exert a powerful
force for truthtelling. The opportunity to judge the demeanor of a witness face-toface is accorded great value in our tradition. Transmission cannot be justified
merely by showing that it is inconvenient for the witness to attend trial.
Id. at 723 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 43 advisory committee note (1996 amendment)).

The Perotti court continued:
Videoconference proceedings have their shortcomings. "[V]irtual reality is rarely
a substitute for actual presence and ... even in an age of advancing technology,
watching an event on the screen remains less than the complete equivalent of
actually attending it." United States v. Lawrence, 248 F .3d 300, 304 (4th Cir.
2001 ). "The immediacy of a living person is lost" with video technology. Stoner
v. Sowders, 997 F.2d 209,213 (6th Cir. 1993). As the court in Edwards v. Logan,
38 F.Supp.2d 463 (W.D.Va 1999), observed, "Video conferencing ... is not the
same as actual presence, and it is to be expected that the ability to observe
demeanor, central to the fact-finding process, may be lessened in a particular case
by video conferencing. This may be particularly detrimental where it is a party to
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the case who is participating by video conferencing, since personal impression
may be a crucial factor in persuasion." 38 F.Supp.2d at 467.
Perotti at 723-24 (quoting Thornton v. Snyder, 428 F.3d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 2005)).

Under the new Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 43, effectively July 1, 2016, and the Perotti
analysis under Federal Rule 43, there were no compelling circumstances justifying Ms. Savage's
testimony over Skype. Ms. Savage was in Chinook, Montana, rather than across or out of the
country.3 (Tr Vol. I, p. 141, L. 12-13.) Ms. Savage was not suffering from an unexpected or
sudden illness or tragedy that otherwise hindered her ability to travel; instead, Chelsea's counsel
moved the magistrate court for permission for Ms. Savage to appear via Skype well in advance
of the December trial date. (R Vol. I, p. 55-56.) Had Ms. Savage been absolutely unable to testify
in person at the trial in December, Chelsea's counsel could have arranged for Ms. Savage to be
deposed. Simply put, there were other options available to Chelsea's counsel for including Ms.
Savage's testimony into the record within the purview of Rule 43 of the civil procedural rules
and Rule 712 of the family law procedural rules, and any inconvenience to Ms. Savage was not
sufficient justification to permit her testimony via Skype.
Despite objections from Zane's counsel, the magistrate court permitted Ms. Savage to
testify via Skype from her location in Chinook, Montana. (Tr Vol. I, pp. 10-11; id. at pp. 142143.) As shown by the trial transcript, the "appropriate safeguards" contemplated by the new

3

Any inconvenience endured by Ms. Savage in traveling from Chinook, Montana to Blackfoot
for the trial underscores the distance between Zane in Blackfoot and the children in Havre,
Montana and the onerous travel burden on the children under the magistrate court's order.
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Rule 43 were not present during Ms. Savage's testimony. During Ms. Savage's testimony, there
were problems with the video delay.
THE COURT: And there is some - there is a problem with the delay and stuff; so
sometimes I'm not even hearing the question and answer before I get an
objection. And that is part of the technology.
(Tr Vol. I, p. 153, L. 8-11.) At other times during Ms. Savage's testimony, the video went black.

(Id. at p.182, L. 15 - p. 183, L. 22.) Ms. Savage's words during her testimony were frequently
unintelligible over the Skype call. (See generally Tr Vol. I, p. 141, L. 1 - p. 174, L. 12; id. at p.
182, L. 1 - p. 206, L. 19.) Zane's counsel expressed his frustration with trying to cross-examine
Ms. Savage over the poor Skype connection:
THE COURT:

Just wait for her answers.

MR. BRUNSON:

I'm - okay.

THE COURT:

You're not waiting for my answers, even. Can you do it?

MR. BRUNSON:

I'm trying, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

Well, do it.

MR. BRUNSON:

Okay.

THE COURT:

That's the order.

MR. BRUNSON:

Okay. It's just - it's hard for me to do that with the video.

THE COURT:

Well, take a breath.

MR. BRUNSON:

I'm-I'm-

THE COURT:

Wait for her answers.

MR. BRUNSON:

I'm trying. I'm struggling.
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THE COURT:
She will answer. I think she can answer, and you can get
your questions in. I know this technology is difficult, and it's harder when they're
over the Internet like this. But just let her answer, please.
(Tr Vol. I, p. 196, L. 18 -p. 197, L. 11.)
There were no compelling circumstances to justify Ms. Savage's testimony via Skype,
rather than in person in the courtroom. Further, even had there been compelling circumstances to
justify Ms. Savage's testimony via Skype, there were not appropriate safeguards in place to
ensure her testimony came through in a clear and coherent manner. Permitting Ms. Savage's
testimony via Skype introduced uncertainty into the proceedings and prejudiced Zane in his
ability to effectively cross-examine Ms. Savage.
Under any iteration of Rule 43, the magistrate court abused its discretion in permitting
Ms. Savage to testify via Skype at trial, rather than require Ms. Savage to testify in person in the
courtroom pursuant to Rule 43 and Rule 712 of the family law procedural rules.

D. The magistrate court abused its discretion in allowing Ms. Savage's testimony.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702, which governs testimony by expert witnesses, states:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
IDAHO R. Evrn. 702 (2016).

"A qualified expert is one who possesses 'knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education.' Formal training is not necessary, but practical experience or special
knowledge must be shown to bring a witness within the category of an expert.
The proponent of the testimony must lay foundational evidence showing that the
individual is qualified as an expert on the topic of his or her testimony."
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Clair, 153 Idaho at 287,281 P.3d at 124 (quoting Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho
834, 837, 153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2007).
Though a magistrate court has "broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence, and to
determine whether a witness is qualified as an expert," "'an abuse of discretion occurs when the
evidence is insufficient to support a magistrate's conclusion that the interests and welfare of the
children would be best served by the magistrate court's order."' Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278,
282-83, 281 P.3d 115, 119-120 (2012) (internal citations omitted). The magistrate court abused
its discretion in allowing testimony proffered by Chelsea's expert witness.
1. Chelsea's expert lacked understanding of Idaho custodial law.

Rule 702 requires that an expert witness have scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge that assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in
issue. IDAHO R. Evm. 702 (2016). As revealed during Zane's cross-examination of Ms. Savage at
trial, Ms. Savage was unfamiliar with Idaho custodial standards (as well as the children's
environment in Blackfoot, Idaho, infra):
Q.
Yeah. You are not familiar with the standard used to determine custody in
Idaho?
A.

Correct. I am not.

Q.

You've never been an expert witness in Idaho before; correct?

A.

That is correct.

(Tr Vol. I, p. 188, L. 25 -p. 189, L. 5.) In later testimony, Ms. Savage again demonstrated her
unfamiliarity with Idaho custodial standards, specifically "Idaho's presumption that it is in the
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child's best interest to maintain frequent and continuing contact with both parents, unless one
parent is an habitual perpetrator of domestic violence," Bartosz v. Jones. 146 Idaho 449,454,
197 P.3d 310,315 (2008) (citing IDAHO CODE§ 32-7178 (2008)):
Q.
And would you agree with me that it is very important that Dad - and, in
this case, that would be Zane Reed - have frequent and continuing contacts with
his daughters?
A.

I would need to discuss the definition of "frequent."

(Tr Vol. I, p. 190, L. 5-10.)
Q.
And you agree with me that the biological it's important for the girls to
have continuing contacts and frequent contacts with the biological parents;
correct?
A.

Again, frequent is negotiable, but yes. Consistent.

(Id. atp.194, L. 1-6.)
Upon the conclusion of Ms. Savage's testimony, Zane's counsel moved to strike her
testimony in its entirety. (Id. at p. 208, L. 8-16.) The magistrate court denied the motion to strike
Ms. Savage's testimony. (Id. at p. 209, L. 15-23.) In so doing, the magistrate court abused its
discretion by including Ms. Savage's testimony in the record and possibly considering it for
purposes of determining custody of the children. 4
Ms. Savage, by her own admission, was unfamiliar with Idaho custodial standards,
including the presumption that it is in a child's best interests to have frequent, continuing contact
with both parents, provided domestic violence is not an issue. Without this basic understanding
4

As noted above, supra, because the magistrate court failed to address any expert witness
testimony in its findings of fact and conclusions of law, including whether it accepted or
disregarded expert witness recommendations, there is uncertainty as to the extent to which the
magistrate court considered Ms. Savage's testimony in drafting its decision.
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of Idaho custodial standards, Ms. Savage was not qualified to recommend a custodial
arrangement to the magistrate court. Ms. Savage's acknowledged unfamiliarity with Idaho
custodial standards rendered her testimony unhelpful to the magistrate court in determining what
was in the best interest of the children pursuant to Idaho law, contrary to the requirements of
evidentiary rule 702. Because Ms. Savage was not qualified to testify as an expert witness, the
magistrate's failure to strike her testimony in full was an abuse of discretion.

2. Chelsea's expert's failed to evaluate the children's Idaho environment.
Not only did Ms. Savage acknowledge her unfamiliarity with Idaho custodial standards,
she also admitted her unfamiliarity with the children's environment in Blackfoot, Idaho:
Q.

And you've never been to Blackfoot, Idaho?

A.

I've actually driven through there.

Q.
that?

Okay. But-you've driven through there one time. Was that- when was

A.

It was years ago. But, no, I have not spent time there.

Q.
And you have not observed the two girls that we're talking about today in
that environment, have you?
A.

Correct.

Q.

You have not visited with any of their extended family, have you?

A.

I have not.

Q.
And you really don't even know what the extended family situation is in
Blackfoot, Idaho, do you?
A.

Only of hearsay.
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(Tr Vol. I, p. 189, L. 6-21.) In her evaluation of the children's situation, Ms. Savage did not
investigate the children's environment in Idaho; instead, Ms. Savage focused the entirety of her
evaluation, and her subsequent custodial recommendation, on her 45-minute interview with the
children at her office, and a follow-up interview with Chelsea and Daniel Sorensen. (Tr Vol. I, p.
192, L. 6-11; id. atp. 192, L. 18-p. 193, L. 6.)
Ms. Savage's evaluation of the children failed to address other factors articulated in Idaho
Code§ 32-717, including without limitation Zane's wishes; the children's interactions with
Zane's other children; the children's familiarity and adjustment with their school and community
in Blackfoot; and the need to promote continuity and stability in the children's lives. See IDAHO
CODE § 32-717 (2016). In fact, Ms. Savage testified that her view of the children's best interests
excluded these additional factors:

Q.

And what about- what about a family unit? Does if the girls were here
and awarded custody to Zane, is that a family unit in comparison? How can you
compare those two family units to what they have in Montana?

A.
It - from the perspective of what is best for the girls, it has nothing to do
with whether they're in Montana or Florida or Egypt. It has to do with the fact
that they are maintaining their residence with the primary - with their mother and
the primary source of their nurturing since birth.
Q.
So the relevant factor that you're talking about is that the situation that
they've been in since birth is where they should stay?
A.

Correct.

(Tr Vol. I, p. 185, L. 1-15.)
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Ms. Savage likewise failed to consider other factors unique to this case, including
Chelsea's plan to move back to the Blackfoot area, and its potential negative effects on the
children:
Q.
So were you aware that the testimony in this case is that Morn and Stepdad
intend on coming back to Blackfoot, Idaho?
A.

Yes. I understand that that is one possibility.

Q.

And that's something they told you?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And you would agree that moving has impact on these girls; correct?

A.
Positive and negative, yes. "Impact" is a - it's a nebulous term. So, of
course, it has impact. It can be positive; it can be negative.
Q.

And certainly can have long-term, lasting negative impact; correct?

A.

Not nee [sic] - I don't understand- I don't know.

Q.

You don't know? Is that your answer?

A.

Correct.

(Id. at p. 199, L. 25 - p. 200, L. 18.)
By her own admission, Ms. Savage could not speak to the negative impact a future move
back to Blackfoot would have on the children. Ms. Savage's failure to evaluate the children's
environment in Blackfoot rendered her opinion irrelevant and unhelpful to the magistrate court
for purposes of determining whether it was in the best interests of the children to remain in
Blackfoot or to relocate to Havre, Montana. Ms. Savage's testimony regarding the children's
situation in Havre was essentially putting the cart before the horse, or shifting the burden to Zane
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to show it was in the best interests of the children to return and remain in Blackfoot, Idaho.
Chelsea, as the relocating parent, has the burden of proving that relocation to Havre is in the best
interests of the children. Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449,457, 197 P.3d 310,318 (2008) (citing
Roberts v. Roberts, 138 Idaho 401,405, 64 P.3d 321,331 (2003). Ms. Savage's testimony
regarding the children's adjustment to Havre, after the fact, was not informative to the issue
before the magistrate court.
Because Ms. Savage lacked both familiarity with Idaho custodial standards, as well as
knowledge and understanding of the children's Blackfoot environment, the magistrate court
abused its discretion in denying Zane's counsel's motion to strike Ms. Savage's testimony.
E. The magistrate court abused its discretion in determining it was in the
children's best interest to relocate to Havre, Montana.
"For determinations of custody, a magistrate court is required to base its decision on the
best interests of the child." Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278,283,281 P.3d 115, 120 (2012). The
best interests of a child are of "paramount importance" in child custody proceedings. Schultz v.
Schultz, 145 Idaho 859,862, 187 P.3d 1234, 1237 (2008). "Under Idaho law, unless one parent is
a habitual perpetrator of domestic violence, it is presumed that an award of joint custody serves a
child's best interest." Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449, 456, 197 P.3d 310, 317 (2008); see also
IDAHO CODE § 32-717B (2016). "An award of joint physical custody must assure that the child
has 'frequent and continuing contact with both parents,' but this 'does not necessarily mean the
child's time with each parent should be exactly the same in length nor does it necessarily mean
the child should be alternating back and forth over certain periods of time between each parent."'
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Bartosz, 146 Idaho at 456, 197 P.3d at 317 (quoting IDAHO CODE § 32-7178 (2016) ).
Idaho Code § 32-717 sets out a list of non-exhaustive relevant factors a magistrate court
may consider in determining custody. IDAHO CODE§ 32-717 (2016); Clair, 153 Idaho at 283,
281 P.3d at 120. These factors include the parents' wishes; the child's wishes; the child's
relationship to his or her parents and siblings; the child's adjustment to his or her home, school,
and community; the character and circumstances of those involved; and the need to promote
continuity and stability in the child's life. IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (2016). Magistrate courts are
"free to consider other factors that may be relevant." Bartosz, 146 Idaho at 454, 197 P.3d at 315;

see also IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (2016).
When a parent decides unilaterally to move out of state with a child, "the relocating
parent can be awarded physical custody only where he or she proves by a preponderance of the
evidence that the move is in the child's best interests." Clair, 153 Idaho at 285, 281 P.3d at 122
(citing Danti v. Danti, 146 Idaho 929,935,204 P.3d 1140, 1146 (2009)).
Further, because of the presumption reflected in LC. § 32-7178 favoring the
active participation of both parents, "it is presumed that it is not in the child's best
interests to permit one parent to unilaterally remove a child from the community
where the parents and child resided when such move prevents the other parent
from having frequent and continuing contact with the child."

Clair, 153 Idaho at 285,281 P.3d at 122 (quoting Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882,889, 173
P.3d 1141, 1148 (2007) (Eismann, CJ., specially concurring)).
1. Chelsea did not meet her burden in proving relocation was in the best
interests of the children.

Because Chelsea unilaterally decided to move the children in Havre, Montana, she had
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the burden to prove to the magistrate court by a preponderance of the evidence that such a move
was in the best interests of the children. Because the weight of the evidence indicated it was in
the children's best interest to remain in Blackfoot, Chelsea did not meet her burden, and the
magistrate court abused its discretion in determining the children should be permitted to remain
in Havre, Montana with Chelsea.
In Clair v. Clair, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed a magistrate court's custody decision
regarding a similar relocation situation. 153 Idaho 278,281 P.3d 115 (2012). In Clair, a mother
appealed after a magistrate court determined it was in the subject child's best interests to
continue to reside in the Pocatello area, rather than relocate with his mother to Nevada. Id., 153
Idaho at 283-84, 281 P.3d at 120-121. In determining custody of the child, the magistrate court
determined "it was the court's responsibility, not the parents, to examine where [the child] should
live in the future." Id., 153 Idaho at 283,281 P.3d at 120. The magistrate court analyzed the
factors set forth in Idaho Code§ 32-717:
The magistrate court concluded that the interrelationship between the child and
parents, and the child's adjustment to home, school, and community favored
shared custody in Idaho because a move to Reno with Tracy would not have a
positive effect on [the child's] relationship with Charles. Also, the magistrate
court reasoned that the proposed move from Ely to Reno by Tracy would be to a
community unknown to [the child], whereas, [the child] had spent most of his life
in Pocatello, and was already familiar with Charles' new home and the child care
providers in Pocatello. [The child] would be unfamiliar with the surroundings if
Tracy moved to Reno. The conclusions for the promotion of continuity and
stability in [the child's] life also focused on Tracy relocating to Reno. The
magistrate court reasoned that custody in Pocatello would promote more
continuity and stability in [the child's] life because of familiarity with the area - a
"stable known environment."

Id, 153 Idaho at 283-84, 281 P.3d at 120-21.
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The magistrate court determined that both parties were loving parents to the child, and
"that the analysis of the best interests of the child indicated the ideal arrangement would be
living in Pocatello with both parents nearby to share an overnight custody rotation." Id., 153
Idaho at 284,281 P.3d at 121. To facilitate this determination, the magistrate court crafted
alternative custody arrangements, all of which had the child residing in Pocatello. Id. The Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate court's decision, finding that the alternative custodial
arrangements crafted by the magistrate court were within the magistrate court's discretion and
consistent with applicable legal standards. Id.
Like the mother in Clair, Chelsea failed to meet her burden to show that her proposed
relocation of the children in Havre, Montana, was in their best interest. "Under Idaho law, it is
presumed that a continuing relationship with both parents is in the child's best interest." Id., 153
Idaho at 284,281 P.3d at 121 (quoting Schultz v. Schultz, 145 Idaho 859, 865, 187 P.3d 1234,
1240 (2008)); see also IDAHO CODE § 32-717B (2016) ("Joint physical custody shall be shared
by the parents in such a way to assure the child a frequent and continuing contact with both
parents ... "). Prior to Chelsea's unilateral move to Havre, Montana, Zane spent every other
weekend with the children. (R Vol. I, p. 108, Hr'g Tr 49:25-51: 11.) In addition, Zane attended
the children's school programs and athletic events. (Id at p. 107, Hr'g Tr 44:23-45:19.) Under
the visitation schedule adopted by the magistrate court in its findings of fact and conclusions of
law, Zane's visitation was reduced to three-day visits each month, alternating holidays, and six
weeks' visitation during the summer months. (Id at pp. 69-70.) These visits between Zane and
the children require the children to travel roundtrip for fifteen hours. (Id.) The evidence at trial
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did not support the change from Zane's frequent and continuous contact with the children to the
visitation plan determined by the magistrate judge.
Chelsea failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that relocation to Havre,
Montana, was in the children's best interests. Instead, analysis of the factors articulated in Idaho
Code § 32-717 indicate it is in the children's best interests to remain in Blackfoot.
Parents' Wishes. As was the case in Clair, and undoubtedly the case in the vast majority
of child custody proceedings, each parent expressed contrary desires for custody, with Chelsea
asking to retain primary physical custody of the children in Havre, Montana, and Zane seeking
for the girls to reside in Blackfoot, with either Chelsea retaining primary physical custody, or
with primary physical custody being transferred to Zane. (R Vol. I, p. 121, Hr'g Tr 100:18-101:6;
Tr Vol. I, p. 125, L. 8-19.) The parents' competing wishes as to custody do not satisfy Chelsea's
burden to show relocation is in the children's best interests.
Children s Wishes. Evidence regarding the children's wishes as to custody was not
supportive of Chelsea's desire to relocate the children to Montana. The magistrate court met with
the children in chambers, without counsel, prior to the temporary orders hearing. (R Vol. I, p. 97,
Hr'g Tr 4:10-5:4.) After talking to the children, the magistrate court determined the children
were neutral regarding a custody determination. (Id. at p. 63.)
Character and Circumstances. Similarly, the magistrate court concluded that the
character and circumstances of the parties, pursuant to Idaho Code § 32-717, was "essentially
neutral." (Id. at p. 67.) The evidence at trial suggested both parents have been involved in the
children's lives, and both parents could provide an adequate home for the children. (Id.)
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Children s Interaction and Relationship with Parents and Siblings. Likewise, evidence at
trial suggested the children interact and have relationships with each of their parents and all of
their half-siblings and step-siblings. (R Vol. I, p. 112, Hr'g Tr 66: 16-20; Tr Vol. I, p. 224, L. 1320; R Vol. I, p. 122, Hr'g Tr 105:1-18.) Further, should Chelsea decide to remain in Blackfoot,
this factor becomes a non-issue, as the children can continue to interact with their parents and all
of their siblings. This is another factor that does not satisfy Chelsea's burden in proving
relocation is in the best interests of the children.
Children sAdiustment to Home, School, and Community. In its findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the magistrate court incorrectly evaluated the children's adjustment to their
home, school, and community under Idaho Code § 32-717 by noting, "The children have made a
good adjustment to their school in Havre." (R Vol. I, p. 67.) This conclusion is contrary to
testimony by Ms. Griggs, who noted the children were still transitioning to living in Havre. (Tr
Vol. I, p. 68, L. 9-23.) Further, the children's adjustment to their school in Havre was not the
consideration before the magistrate court under Idaho Code § 32-717 - rather, because the
question is whether the children should be relocated from Blackfoot, the magistrate court should
have instead focused its analysis under Idaho Code § 32-717 on the children's adjustment to their
home, school, and community in Blackfoot.
The evidence at trial supports a conclusion that the children were well-adjusted to their
home, school, and community in Blackfoot. The children were surrounded by extended family
members in Blackfoot. (Tr Vol. I, p. 46, L 7 -p. 48, L. 11; R Vol. I, p. 100, Hr'g Tr 18:12-18.)
The children frequently spent time with Zane's parents. (R Vol. I, p. 98, Hr'g Tr 9:12-25; id at p.
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141, Hr'g Tr 182:4-25.) The children saw their maternal grandfather, the principal of Snake
River Middle School, every school day. (Tr Vol. I, p. 317, L. 4-8.) The children were welladjusted to and familiar with their environment and surroundings in Blackfoot, which weighed
against relocation with Chelsea to Havre, Montana.

Need to Promote Continuity and Stability. Finally, the evidence at trial suggested that
residence in Blackfoot, rather than Havre, Montana, would promote the greatest continuity and
stability for the children. As noted above, the children have spent the majority of their lifetime in
Blackfoot, Idaho, surrounded by extended family and friends. Supra. In addition, and again as
noted above, the children are well-adjusted to their school and community. Supra. Even
Chelsea's husband, Daniel Sorensen, acknowledged under oath that relocating the children to
Havre from Blackfoot would not promote stability in the childrens' lives:

Q.

Thank you. And, in fact, what you're proposing to the Court is the exact
opposite of stability. You're going to pull the girls out of Blackfoot, take them to
Havre, and bring them back. Isn't that what you're suggesting?
A.

Yes.

(R Vol. I, p. 133, Hr'g Tr 151:3-9.)
In determining what custody arrangement would best promote continuity and stability in

the lives of the children, the magistrate court looked only within the confines of their household:
"The need to promote continuity and stability in the life of the child argues for the physical
custody to be with the Plaintiff, in that the children have been living with their mother since birth
or more than ten years." (R Vol. I, p. 67.) In so concluding, the magistrate court did not address
the possibility that Chelsea could reside in Blackfoot, and therefore maintain primary physical
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custody of the children. Further, in addressing the need to promote continuity and stability in the
children's lives, the magistrate court improperly and narrowly focused its approach on the
children's household, rather than the broader view articulated by both Ms. Griggs and Mr. Gamer
regarding promoting continuity and stability for the children:
Ms. Griggs:

Q.

And what are - what is your opinion?

A.
My opinion is that it is in the best interest of the girls to stay in Blackfoot,
with both primary - both parents' primary attachments here.
Q.

And why is that? Why is that your opinion?

A.

Well, as I've stated, that's what provides security for the girls.
When you look at relocation issues or divorce issues, you want to
minimize loss and maximize relationships. And that's why my opinion is that they
should stay in Blackfoot, because of the losses that they would have if they go to
Montana. They lose their extended family. They might lose their community.
They lose the people they might go to church with. They lose all of that
continuity, the - and frequent contact with the parent that remains (Tr Vol. I, p. 71, L. 25 - p. 72, L. 15.)
Mr. Garner:

Q.
Okay. All right. Based on all of that, do you have an opinion about what
the best interest of the children is in this case? What should happen?
A.
I guess I do. I do have an opinion. And, you know, unfortunately, there is
damage, if you want to call it that, to their social structure. How much damage is
going to occur developmentally, I don't know. I think, in these types of situations,
its - you know, it's a guessing game. It's a gamble, regardless of how you pick
and choose.
But in order to reduce or minimize damage, the ideal thing in my mind
would be to restore their previous social structure, their previous environment, as
much as is possible, which - which, at this point, would be for the - for the
nuclear family of the -well, I can't call it nuclear family per se, because we're -

Appellant Brief 34

you know, we could be talking biological parents but for their mother and
stepfather, Chelsea and Dan Sorensen, to live in Blackfoot and carry on the same
type of level of activity and schedule that they previously have had.
(Id. at p. 99, L. 24 -p. 100, L. 19.) As demonstrated by this testimony from Ms. Griggs and Mr.

Garner, considerations on how to best promote continuity and stability in a child's life extends
beyond the confines of a home. Instead, the evidence indicates that custody of the children in
Blackfoot would promote more continuity and stability in the children's lives because of
"familiarity with the area- a 'stable known environment."' Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278,284,
281 P.3d 115, 121 (2012).
The custody arrangement established by the magistrate court does not promote continuity
and stability in the children's lives. As ordered by the magistrate court, the children now travel
for 15 hours roundtrip once a month to see Zane, an arrangement an expert witness termed
"detrimental to the children." (R Vol. I, pp. 69-70; Tr Vol. I, p. 115, L. 17 - 21.) The current
travel schedule requires the children to miss occasional days of school. (Id.) The overwhelming
weight of expert testimony suggested this level of traveling would be detrimental to the children:
Ms. Griggs:
Q.

What impacts can traveling have on children in this type of situation?

A.
Well, children really resent traveling. It disrupts their schedule, and they
end up spending a significant amount of time in a car rather than when - in a visit
with parents. If - depending on how much time that is, if going to see one parent
means "I'm in the car for eight hours," that's not fun. And that's disruptive.
It takes them away from activities they may want to do. It takes them
away from sports they may want to do. It takes them away from their daily life,
their friends.
So it's basically saying "I'm disrupting everything and breaking you away
from one connection and taking you to another, then give you just long enough to
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start to re-establish that, then breaking you away from that and taking you back."
And kids don't like it. It's very hard on them.

Q.

And, in your experience, do kids blame one parent?

A.
Typically, children start to be angry and blame the parent who they see who they perceive as the one making them travel, who is usually the one they're
traveling to see.
(Tr Vol. I, p. 68, L. 25

p. 69, L. 24.)

M,: Garner:
Q.
Do you think it's viable to travel that - I mean, how does that affect
children, if they're traveling that far every other week? You really think that's a
viable plan, whether they're coming this way or that way or who lives where?
A.
No. I don't believe it's viable for children to travel. It's much easier for
adults to travel. I mean, we all have heard the - and put up with at least those of
us that are parents, with the "Are we there yet? Are we there yet?" kind of thing,
even when it's a good trip.
But when they are frequent and exhaustive trips, then there is resentment
fostered towards the whole process Q.
A.

Right.
and towards the adults that are forcing it upon them.

(Id. at p. 252, L. 23 - p. 253, L. 14.)

The evidence presented at trial addressing the factors articulated in Idaho Code § 32-717
indicate the magistrate court's order that the children stay with Chelsea in Montana was not a
"very close call." See Lamont v. Lamont, 158 Idaho 353,361,347 P.3d 645,653 (2015). Instead,
evidence relating to these factors, taken as a whole, suggest it was in the children's best interest
to remain in Blackfoot. Chelsea, as the relocating parent, failed to meet her burden in
demonstrating relocating to Havre, Montana was in the children's best interests, and the
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magistrate court abused its discretion in sanctioning her unilateral move.

Impact on Children ofFuture Second }vfove. In addition to the factors articulated in Idaho
Code § 32-717, magistrate courts are free to look at other relevant issues when determining child
custody. Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449, 454, 197 P.3d 310, 315 (2008). In this case, one such
relevant factor, closely related to the principle of promoting continuity and stability in the
children's lives, is Chelsea's planned future move back to Blackfoot, a factor which distinguishes
this case from fact patterns found in other Idaho relocation cases. See generally Lamont v.

Lamont, 158 Idaho 353,247 P.3d 115 (2015). Chelsea and Daniel Sorensen both testified that
they plan to move with their family back to the Blackfoot area in a few years, depending on
Daniel's ability to obtain employment in the area. (R Vol. I, p. 133, Hr'g Tr 150:22-24; id. at p.
12 1, Hr' g Tr 10 1:7-18.)
Ms. Griggs testified to the inherent difficulties associated with requiring the children to
first integrate into their community in Havre, Montana, only to then have them attempt to
reestablish relationships in Blackfoot upon moving back to the area in a few years:
Q.
Can you describe the probable outlook of a transition back to Blackfoot in
junior high school in three years?
A.
I think it's really concerning. I think that taking the children away and during these formative years and helping - and allowing them to establish a whole
new community, a new school, all of those new relationships, and basically end
those relationships here for most purposes, especially friend and school purposes,
and then having them come back at the transitional years of puberty, of 13 and
junior high, which are the most difficult for girls especially, creates a real
struggle.
They're going to have to come back and try and integrate back into
friendships that they've lost. And it's also really difficult for them to maintain
those, even with good intentions, because, if the parent that remains has such a
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short amount of time, they don't want to share that with - let you go to your
friends' house. And so it's really hard to maintain those friendships, even with
good intentions.
(Tr Vol. I, p. 70, L. 4-24.)
Q.
So let me ask you this question: If the only option is for the kids to stay in
Montana with Mom and Stepdad or switch primary custody to Dad in Blackfoot,
which would be better for the kids of this age and these circumstances?
A.
I believe it would be for the kids to switch primary custody to Dad and
have as much visitation and continuity of contact with Mom and they remain in
Blackfoot.
Q.

And why- and why do you think that?

A.
Because the research supports it, because that's where they're moving
back to. It prevents multiple transitions. We talked yesterday - I talked yesterday
about maximizing relationships and minimizing loss. In the situation if they move
now, they re-establish, they move again, there's multiple losses in that scenario.
Right now, they have not lost the relationships in Blackfoot. They haven't
lost their connection to home, school, community, extended family. That hasn't
been lost.
And so if we can re get them back here, that won't be a loss. And but if
they go and re-establish there, there will be more and more distance, that
represents a loss, loss ofrelationship. And then they'll lose again when they have
to move back, and they'll have to do it all over again.
And so I believe them staying in Blackfoot is in their best interest.

(Id. at p. 240, L. IO

p. 241, L. 13.)

Despite this extensive testimony regarding the detrimental effects a second future move
would have on the children, the magistrate court determined it was in the children's best interests
to remain in Chelsea's primary physical custody in Havre, Montana. This was an abuse of
discretion, given the weight of the evidence addressing the potential social and emotional
upheaval the children face in moving a second time, compared to the alternative of keeping the
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children in Blackfoot.
Chelsea did not meet her burden, as the relocating parent, to prove a relocation to Havre,
Montana, was in the children's best interests. Again, it was not "a very close call." Instead, the
evidence at trial, including applicable expert witness testimony, skewed in favor of the children
residing in Blackfoot. Because Chelsea failed to meet her burden, the magistrate court abused its
discretion when, after analysis of the factors articulated in Idaho Code § 32-717, and in spite of
overwhelming expert testimony to the contrary, it determined it was in the children's best interest
to be uprooted from their environment in Blackfoot and relocated to Havre, Montana.
2. The magistrate court improperly considered Chelsea's position over the
best interests of the children.
Despite the overwhelming evidence indicating it was in the children's best interests to
remain in Blackfoot, the magistrate court determined the children should stay with Chelsea and
be allowed to move to Havre, Montana. (R Vol. I, p. 69.) In so concluding, the magistrate court
abused its discretion to determine what was in the children's best interests by instead making
concessions for Chelsea's unilateral decision to move to Montana.
A magistrate court determines custody based on what is in the child's or children's best
interests. Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278,283,281 P.3d 115, 120 (2012) (citing Schultz v. Schultz,
145 Idaho 859, 862, 187 P.3d 1234, 1237 (2008). A magistrate court does not award custody
based on the parents' preferences or wishes. Clair, 153 Idaho at 286, 281P.3d at 123 ("Granted,
the separation was not easy for Tracy, but this does not mean that the magistrate court is required
to consider Tracy's interests above the best interests of [the child].").
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As noted above, the evidence at trial suggested that it was in the children's best interests
to continue to reside in Blackfoot instead of moving to Havre, Montana, only to then move back
to Blackfoot in a few years' time. See supra. Additional expert witness testimony suggested it
was unfair to lay the burden of Chelsea's unilateral move to Montana on the children:
Q.
What, under that circumstance, then do you think the parents should do Mom and Dad?
A.
Well, based on the transcripts that I read, Mom has been the primary
custodial parent for all of their lives. And I believe that should remain, if that's
here in Blackfoot. I believe the children don't need to be disrupted from that.
Unfortunately, in this case, adults have made decisions that affect children
greatly. And I believe both options of them staying here with a change of primary
custody and a move there, disruption of custody or visitation with Dad are both
disruptive, like the Court said.
And so I believe what's in the best interest of the children is to stay in
Blackfoot, maintain primary custody with Mom, and resume what was already set
in place from the beginning. That's what's known.
And that the people - the adults should bear the burden of the travel. The
adults should bear the burden of the decisions that have been made, not the
children, especially given the fact that, in three years, they're going to come back,
and then the children will bear that burden again.
The adults won't be the ones trying to integrate back into school and into
friendships. The adults won't be the ones trying to re-establish those connections.
Because adults are much better suited to manage that on their own, and
kides aren't. And so it puts a significant burden on these children to disrupt them
that way and then bring them back.
(Tr Vol. I, p. 72, L. 25 -p. 74, L. 5.)
In addition, further evidence at trial suggested that a custody order requiring the children
to reside in Blackfoot would not "pose a substantial hardship" to Chelsea, as was the case with a
relocating mother in Lamont v. Lamont, 158 Idaho 353, 360, 34 7 P.3d 645, 652 (2015). In
Lamont, the mother, a single parent, sought to relocate from Salmon, Idaho to Meridian, Idaho,
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for a new job. Id, 158 Idaho at 358-59, 347 P.3d at 650-51. The mother presented evidence that
"because of negative job factors in Salmon," including the likelihood that she would lose her job
with the Salmon School District, it was in the best interests of the children that she be permitted
to relocate with them to Meridian. Id. The magistrate court, in what the Idaho Supreme Court
termed "a very close call," determined that Salmon's economically depressed status would result
in a "substantial hardship" if the mother were not permitted to relocate to Meridian with the
children. Id., 158 Idaho at 360-361, 347 P.3d at 653-54.
Unlike the mother in Lamont, the evidence at trial indicated Chelsea would not suffer a
"substantial hardship" if the children were to remain in Blackfoot. Chelsea had the means
available to either reside in Blackfoot, and thereby retain primary physical custody of the
children, or to travel to Blackfoot on weekends to visit the children. Chelsea's father, Dean
Bonney, testified that Chelsea and the children would "absolutely" be welcome at his home in
Blackfoot. (Tr Vol. I, p. 313, L. 10-23.) Mr. Bonney also testified that he and other family
members would be available to help Chelsea, as necessary. (Id. at p. 313, L. 24- p. 314, L. 18.)
Zane's mother, Karen Reed, testified at the hearing on temporary orders that she was also willing
and able to provide help in caring for the children. (R Vol. I, p. 141, Hr'g Tr 182:4-25.)
While Chelsea conveyed her desire to move to Havre, Montana, with her husband, it
remains that Chelsea's interests should not have factored into the magistrate court's decision.
Chelsea unilaterally decided to move to Havre, Montana, and while the magistrate court cannot
order Chelsea to live in Blackfoot, it also cannot base its determination of the children's best
interests on her unilateral decision to relocate. Clair, 153 Idaho at 285, 281 P.3d at 122.
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Instead, the magistrate court should have considered only what was in the best interests
of the children, irrespective of Chelsea's decision to move to Montana. Given the overwhelming
evidence that it was in the children's best interests to remain in Blackfoot, the magistrate court
should have ordered a custody arrangement that would meet that objective. Instead, the
magistrate court abused its discretion in determining that the children would move to Havre,
Montana, to remain in Chelsea's primary physical custody.
F. The magistrate court abused its discretion in improperly considering the tender
years doctrine in issuing its decision.
The tender years doctrine, which calls for a child of "tender years" to be cared for by his
or her mother, rather than by his or her father, was a frequently cited factor in child custody
decisions dating from more than a half century ago:
It is the established rule of this court, and other courts as well, that, all other

considerations being equal, a child of tender age or a girl of even more mature
years can and will be reared, trained and cared for best by its mother. This
conclusion needs no argument to support it because it arises out of the very nature
and instincts of motherhood; nature has ordained it.

Kriegerv. Krieger, 59 Idaho 301, _ , 81 P.2d 1081, 1083 (1938).
Today, almost 80 years after publication of the Krieger opinion, the tender years doctrine
"has limited impact in Idaho law. To the extent previous case law exists which suggests a
preference for the mother as custodian of a child of tender years, the preference exists only when
all other considerations are equal." Moye v. Moye, 102 Idaho 170, 172-73, 627 P.2d 799, 801-02
(1981) (citing Prescott v. Prescott, 97 Idaho 257,261, 542 P.2d 1176, 1180 (1975)). The tender
years doctrine only comes into consideration in situations wherein all other factors in the child
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custody determination weigh in favor of each parent equally. Clair v. Clair, 153 Idaho 278, 283,
281 P.3d 115, 120 (2012) (citing Moye, 102 Idaho at 172-73, 627 P.2d at 801-02).
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the magistrate court noted:
The Court has also considered the ages of the children. As they enter their preteen years, the issues of maturation are important. Having a stay at home mother
is an important consideration for the court.
(R Vol. I, p. 68.) While the magistrate court did not explicitly reference the "tender years"
doctrine in the above language, the court's reference to Chelsea's status as a "stay at home
mother" and the children's "issues of maturation" indicates the magistrate court considered the
tender years doctrine in concluding it was in the children's best interests to remain in Montana
with Chelsea rather than return to Blackfoot with Zane.
The magistrate court's consideration of the tender years doctrine was an abuse of
discretion. As noted in the Clair opinion, and indeed in all case law addressing the tender years
doctrine, a trial court only considers the tender year doctrine if all other factors in the child
custody proceeding weigh equally in favor of either parent. Such a situation did not exist in this
case, however. (See Tr Vol. I, p. 397, L. 9-17.) As noted above, the evidence at trial, including
both testimony from fact witnesses and testimony from expert witnesses, indicated it is in the
children's best interests to remain in Blackfoot, where they could maintain frequent, continuing
contact with both parents, assuming Chelsea so chose, while remaining surrounded by familiar
extended family, friends, and classmates, without the added stress and trauma associated with
another move in the near future. See supra.
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Because the evidence suggests it is in the children's best interests to stay in Idaho,
whether in Chelsea's primary custody or in Zane's primary custody, the magistrate court should
not have considered the tender years doctrine in making its determination. The tender years
doctrine analysis had no justification in these proceedings, and the magistrate court's
determination that the children would be best cared for by a stay at home mother was
inappropriate and an abuse of discretion.
G. Zane should be awarded his attorney fees on appeal.

Zane requests that the Court order that its attorney fees be awardable by the magistrate
court in the event that Zane is deemed to be the overall prevailing party. See Eighteen Mile

Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 720-21, 117 P.3d 130, 134-35
(2005); IDAHO R. CIV. P. 54(d) & (e) (2016); IDAHO APP. R. 41 (2016); IDAHO CODE§ 12-120
(2016); IDAHO CODE § 12-121 (2016).
V. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED

As a result of the foregoing, the magistrate court should be reversed and an order be
entered ordering Chelsea to immediately return to Blackfoot with the children, or, in the
alternative, transferring primary physical custody of the custody to Zane.
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Dated: June 15, 2016.
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